Perhaps there were still a few out in the Gobi Desert unaware of Kevin Garnett's importance to the Celtics prior to the Orlando series, but even they now know. The Celtics were relegated to taking jump shots against the Magic, and didn't have the legs or energy left to get out at Orlando's shooters.

The Cs, with Ray Allen and Paul Pierce shells of who they can be when teamed with Garnett, might as well have been running in mud. Rajon Rondo, so brilliant early, faded when challenged by Orlando to make shots - or even plays.

For a variety of reasons - some unavoidable and some that could have been handled better - the sequel season to Banner 17 was doomed the moment No. 5 limped off the floor on Feb. 19 in Salt Lake City.

Here's how they graded out this postseason:

Ray Allen - C

(18.3 ppg, .403 FG%, .350 3-point FG%)

This grade would be lower, save for the fact that Allen is so dependant on the system to get open shots. The system didn't click, the Magic did an extraordinary job defending off picks, and Allen rarely got open. As Rivers belatedly revealed, the shooting guard was also hindered by a sore hamstring. His 51-point performance in Game 6 against Chicago was a tremendous high point - though the Celtics did lose that game - but it was surrounded by some deep valleys. He shot 3-for-24 from downtown over the last four games.

Tony Allen - D

(0.09 ppg, 6 minutes per game)

Rivers' lack of faith landed Allen on the bench for all but a smidgeon of time. He averaged six minutes in 10 playoff games, took eight shots, and was essentially a situational player in late-game substitutions. The idea had been that Allen would be the prime go-to reserve when an opposing shooter or slasher needed to be stopped. The Magic had a deep list of such players who destroyed the Celtics . But with the Celtics also pressed to make shots, this inconsistent finisher wasn't an affordable luxury. The Allen lobby argues that he needs the minutes to be effective. But he hasn't earned them, either.

Glen Davis - A-minus

(15.8 ppg, .491 FG%, 5.6 rpg)

Some are saying that the Baby grew into a man, and Davis certainly produced when asked to fill the unfillable gap left by Garnett. He scored from all angles - elbow jumper, baseline jumper, post, Game 4 game-winner in Orlando, you name it. The Celtics desperately needed his offense, and the second-year forward supplied it with a high shooting percentage. He also inherited a near-impossible defensive assignment in Rashard Lewis - a player who even gives trouble to a healthy Garnett. Though Lewis destroyed the Celtics in this series, Davis was clearly out of his element when asked to guard a deep-shooting wing player. Still, the Celtics are probably fortunate that he's only a restricted free agent.

Eddie House - C

(7.7 ppg, .519 FG%, .486 3-point FG%)

You would never know it by his shooting percentages, but House was taken out of the game by Orlando, much in the same fashion that Ray Allen was blitzed out of his effectiveness. He averaged only 2.6 3-point attempts per game in the playoffs. And as the Celtics know, if House isn't hitting his shots, then this average defender is of questionable value. He had three strong games in the playoffs, but other than that, the game-breaker everyone came to love down the regular-season stretch was rarely apparent in the postseason.

Stephon Marbury - C

(3.7 ppg, .303 FG%, 1.8 apg)

Rivers said that Marbury was going to be good for at least one playoff win, and that moment came in Game 5 of the Orlando series. But for the most part he was simply competent. He displayed good judgment and made the right passes. But as that hideous shooting percentage shows, Marbury never had steady confidence in his shot. Prior to his 12-point fourth quarter in Game 5, Marbury was much more comfortable getting the ball to someone else, even when the shot was obviously his to take. He ultimately played like a solid backup, which is not what the real Stephon Marbury is all about.

Mikki Moore - F

(1.5 ppg, 6.5 mpg)

Like Patrick O'Bryant before him, ample opportunity was there for Moore. But as in the regular season, he continued to struggle defensively, and seemed to be equally in trouble in on-the-ball and help situations. He never fully grasped the Celtics' defensive rotations. As a result, the C's were often beaten on back door plays when Moore was on the floor. And not since Vin Baker was a Celtic has this team had a big man so incapable of holding onto rebounds. His offensive value was nil. Rivers finally lost faith in him by the start of the Orlando series, and Moore sank to the end of the bench - a telling development, considering that the Celtics absolutely needed another big man against the Magic. He played just 17 minutes in the series. It was the worst kind of performance for Moore to carry into free agency.

Kendrick Perkins - A

(11.9 ppg, .575 FG%, 11.6 rpg, 2.6 bpg)

Perkins, forced to step out from the shadow of Garnett, revealed himself as one of the best meat-and-potato pivot players in the league. We're not talking about scoring dominance or flashy rebound numbers, just an exquisite job defending Dwight Howard. The Orlando center, not accustomed to playing against another ``5'' this physically strong, was often forced away from the basket by Perkins. He may never become a good or even above-average offensive player, but Perkins has something more important for his position - an edgy stopper's mentality. He was the only Celtic who had a consistently good defensive postseason.

Paul Pierce - C

(21 ppg, .430 FG%, 5.8 rpg, 3.1 apg, 2.36 turnovers per game)

As the playoffs wore on, the captain's assists declined and his turnovers increased. Pierce's efficiency - a quality that has improved each year under Rivers - eroded over the course of 14 postseason games. Like Ray Allen's frustrated quest for open looks, Pierce's ability to attack took a bad hit from the absence of Garnett as a passer out of the post. The result was the old, iso-oriented player who could be so frustrating with the ball. Calls he used to get were no longer so easy to pry from the officials. Rivers belatedly noted that Pierce was suffering from bone spur issues in his ankles, and that had to hurt. But Pierce has never looked older, either.

Rajon Rondo - B-minus

(16.9 ppg, 9.8 apg, 9.7 rpg, .417 FG%, 2.71 TPG)

What is it with Rondo and his tendency to play down to lesser competition? There's no doubt that he's one of the league's most exciting young point guards. He put that up on a giant marquee by averaging a triple double against Chicago. But then came Orlando, with Rafer Alston and Anthony Johnson, and Rondo's aggressiveness diminished. With Alston serving his one-game suspension in Game 3, Rondo allowed Johnson to take the lane. Alston later had his moment in Game 7, burying wide open jumpers that staked the Magic to an early lead. Rondo, as a member of the NBA's all-defensive second team, shouldn't have allowed either player that kind of latitude. In addition, he became turnover-prone and unable to get his team into the flow. He averaged 5.5 assists and shot 11-for-31 (32 percent) in Games 6 and 7 against the Magic - unacceptable numbers for one of the game's exciting young talents. He has a long summer of reflection ahead.

Brian Scalabrine - B

(.448 3-point FG%, 20.5 mpg)

No one thought Scalabrine - a casualty of post-concussion syndrome - would emerge as such an important role player, but when Leon Powe went down for good in Game 2 of the first round, there was no other option. Scal defended Orlando's Lewis better than anyone else in the lineup, and replaced House as the C's best 3-point option off the bench. His value as a role player may have also increased.

Kevin Garnett, Gabe Pruitt, Leon Powe, BILL WALKER, J.R. GIDDENS - INC.

COACHING - C

Injuries certainly took a toll, but the Celtics were also unable to solve their offensive dilemmas in the second round - namely, finding ways to free up Allen and Pierce. Part of the problem was execution, but part was also coaching. Doc Rivers and Co. didn't respond well enough at either end - from the pressure put on the Celtics' scorers to contesting those deep Orlando jumpers. Four overtime games against Chicago also took a toll, but when Rivers lost faith in several members of his bench (hello, Tony Allen, Mikki Moore and Gabe Pruitt), it increased the burden on the regulars.

FRONT OFFICE - C-minus

A grade is included here for the simple fact that last summer's decisions came to bear over 14 playoff games. A decision not to overpay for James Posey burned a hole in the Celtics bench - if not management's pockets - as most knew it would when injuries started to pile up. Danny Ainge, more interested in chasing the stats-heavy, intangibly-light Corey Maggette, left the statistically light but intangibly-heavy Posey on the back burner, before deciding that four years plus the full mid-level was too much. Patrick O'Bryant, and then Mikki Moore, never earned anyone's trust. The plan to replace Posey with a Frankenstein monster of Tony Allen, Brian Scalabrine and whoever else had something to give, never worked. Stephon Marbury, though part of the solution, was not the gamebreaker everyone hoped for. Sometimes, when faced with a small window, a team has to overpay to protect its aging core.